Context and Stakeholder Conflict
On October 6, 2025, the rural prosecutor group known as the Federación Regional de Rondas Campesinas de Cajamarca declared an indefinite regional strike across Cajamarca, protesting delays in infrastructure works (notably the Longitudinal de la Sierra highway), increasing criminal insecurity in mining areas, and the expansion of illegal mining operations in the region. Some of the key roadblocks were placed along the Fernando Belaunde Terry corridor in localities such as Chiple–Cutervo, Chamaya–Jaén and Bellavista–San Ignacio, teed up to press the central government for direct dialogue without intermediaries. The strike was lifted on October 10 after the impeachment of President Dina Boluarte, though at the time roads remained closed and the ronderos demanded immediate ministerial action and commitment.
Economic Impact and License to Operate (LTO) Implications
The strike highlights acute license to operate risks in mining-intensive regions of Peru. Although the protest was framed as infrastructure and security concerns, the underlying grievance included perceived neglect of mining-affected communities and failure to clamp down on informal extraction activities. For formal mining companies operating in Cajamarca—such as those in gold and copper sectors—the blockades disrupted logistics, delayed access to sites and raised alarm about the fragility of community relations. Furthermore, the involvement of ronderos (local peasant patrol organisations) underscores how mining projects in these areas must manage not only environmental and regulatory compliance but also deeply rooted territorial and socio-political dynamics.
Outlook and Stakeholder Strategy
Going forward, mining operators in Cajamarca and similar zones must re-prioritise community engagement and infrastructural linkage as part of their operating licence strategy. The strike showed that infrastructure bottlenecks (roads, connectivity), local insecurity, and illegal mining concern can catalyse broad regional action that impacts formal operations. Companies should review their transport routes, emergency-response protocols, and stakeholder-communication frameworks. Concurrently, government agencies must recognise that “mining risk” in the Andes is increasingly multidimensional—spanning social inclusion, regional development and law enforcement. For investors, Cajamarca’s episode is a reminder that obtaining regulatory licence is no longer sufficient: maintaining social licence entails sustained delivery on local expectations and integration with regional development agendas.

