America’s Strategic Pivot from Supply- Vulnerability to Supply-Control
As of November 2025, the Donald Trump administration has accelerated efforts to reduce U.S. dependence on Chinese-controlled rare-earth metals—crucial components in semiconductors, batteries, military systems and renewable-energy hardware. A high-profile moment: Scott Bessent, U.S. Treasury Secretary, presented what he described as “the first rare-earth magnet produced in the U.S. in 25 years” at a facility in South Carolina. With China still processing over 90% of global rare-earth output and controlling some minerals at near-monopoly levels, the administration’s strategy is urgent—and multipronged.
From Mines to Magnets: Mid-stream Challenges Take Centre Stage
While securing access to ore remains important, the core challenge lies further up the value chain: separation, refining, magnet manufacturing. Even if U.S. mines were scaled rapidly, recreating a full domestic processing ecosystem would take years. Analysts point out that minerals like dysprosium and samarium—essential for high-performance magnets—are still overwhelmingly refined in China (upwards of 99% in some cases). The U.S. is responding with a mix of tactics: forging alliances with Australia, Cambodia and Japan; planning domestic processing facilities (including on Department of Defense installations); using tariffs and export controls to alter market incentives. However, the depth and cost of restructuring such a supply-chain ecosystem suggest that ambition will outpace immediate results.
Implications for Producers, Allies and Global Minerals Governance
For mining-focused countries outside China—including Africa, Latin America and Oceania—the U.S. scramble signals both opportunity and obligation. Demand for refined rare earths and value-added supply- chain services is rising—and so are standards of traceability, governance and domestic processing involvement. For the U.S., the move is not simply about raw‐material security; it is about rebuilding a strategic supply-chain architecture from pit to product. While China retains a structural head-start, the administration’s actions reflect a recognition that control of minerals is inseparable from control of manufacturing, technology and geopolitical leverage.